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Law and Order Without Coercion
G. Marcus Cole'
Stanford Law School
Much of the contemporary discussion regarding law and public
policy focuses on how government ought to address important issues.
From global warming to technological innovation to corporate finance,
voters and policy-makers alike share the belief that the tools of
government ought to be brought to bear on all of the important matters
of our times.
Virtually no attention is given public policy debates, however,
to the question of 2vhether government ought to address these important
issues. In fact, the larger and more complex the issue, the more
policy-makers and opinion leaders assume that government provides the
only mechanism for addressing such concerns. Two types of "market
failure," in particular, commonly serve as justifications for governmental
intervention into and regulation of otherwise private markets and
matters. Private market mechanisms are said to fail where society seeks
the provision of what are commonly called "public goods," and also
where the cooperation of large groups of individuals are necessary in
order to accomplish some task. These latter problems, frequently
termed "collective action" problems, can coincide with the problem of
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Diego, as well as the Annual Meeting of the Association for Private Enterprise
Education in Las Vegas, for helpful comments at earlier stages in the life of this
article. Special thanks are reserved for David Thompson, who provided me with
insightful and conscientious research assistance.
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public goods provision, but can also arise independently of them.
These two typical justifications for imposition of regulation, the
"Public Goods" justification and the "Collective Action" justification,
have largely been embraced by neoclassical economists, and have been
completely unchallenged by legal academics. Nevertheless, the question
as to whether and to what extent private actors can regulate their own
behavior without government coercion is an increasingly important one.
This Article attempts to answer this question by surveying the
literature on private ordering and self-regulating human systems. As
such, it demonstrates the many circumstances under which human
beings have provided law and order to govern their affairs without the
monopolized use of coercive physical force or violence characteristic of,
and indeed defining, governmental regulation.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I outlines the
commonly relied-upon justifications for the use of coercive
governmental force to regulate human affairs. These include the "public
goods" justification, as well as the "common pool" justification. The
conditions surrounding public goods and common pools are assumed
to require governmental intervention and regulation, and typical
examples of these are explored here. Part I concludes with an
explication of the responses to the public goods and common pool
justifications offered by Austrian school and classical economists, which
provide logical albeit theoretical market alternatives to regulatory
solutions.
Part II bridges theory with reality, by exploring the many and
varied historical examples of private order solutions to what neoclassical
economists refer to as public goods or common pool problems. In this
part, the literature expositing these examples is surveyed, detailing the
rise, operation, and decline of sophisticated and complex private legal
orders of the past. These orders are significant examples, in part because
their functioning was often only interrupted by state action and resort
to the government's monopolistic use of legitimized physical force.
Part III brings theory and practice into the present, with an
G. Marcus Cole
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examination of just a few of the many private legal orders that make
modern life possible or prosperous. Unlike many of the historical
examples, these modern private legal orders frequently operate "in the
shadow of the law" provided by governmental entities. Nevertheless,
this survey of contemporary private legal orders illustrates the ways in
which many institutions and industries regulate their own members'
behavior and affairs, without resort to the coercive use of physical force
entailed by governmental regulation.
Part IV explores the future of private ordering, by surveying the
literature proposing innovative market-based solutions to problems
commonly thought to be the province of governmental regulators. This
part suggests that the future of private ordering is limited only by our
imagination and willingness to think freely about the costs and benefits
of market alternatives to the use of physical force by state actors.
Part V concludes.
I. Providing (Laying Down the) Law
A. Law through Government Coercion
As a little known philosopher and engineer once said, "I've
never seen a problem that couldn't be solved with a little physical
violence." To the advocates of state action, this expression is
undoubtedly true. After all, law, as provided by the state, is, in the end,
"violence" (Barnett, 1985 and 1999). Some have defined it as the
legitimized use of physical violence or force (Barnett, 1985).
Government can be seen as having a monopoly on the legitimized use
of physical, coercive force or violence.
To be sure, there are many definitions of law. John Austin, for
example, defined law as "the command of the commander to the
commanded," and backed by a sanction (Austin, 1885; Posner, 1998).
Lon Fuller, on the other hand, defined law as the practice of "subjecting
human conduct to the governance of rules" for the purpose of
achieving order (Fuller, 1964). But whether one embraces a conception
G. Marcus Cole
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of law as Kelsen'sgrundnorm, or H.L.A. Hart's "rules of recognition," the
fact is that most Western, developed societies are "positivist," reflecting
Austin's conception of "command" and "sanction" (Kelsen, 1934; Hart,
1961).
When governmental regulators provide the sanction, that
sanction is coercive force—physical violence. While governments do
not have a monopoly on the use of physical violence, they do enjoy an
exclusive combination of authority and violence. In other words,
governmentally provided law, command and sanction, is the exclusive
resort to the legitimked use of physical violence for the purpose of
ordering human behavior.
Physical violence, legitimate or not, is very effective at ordering
human behavior. Guns in the hands of Nazi troops were very effective
at forcing mothers, fathers, and little children onto the railroad cars
headed for concentration camps. But precisely because physical violence
is so effective at ordering human behavior, many today, academics and
voters alike, assume that physical violence, in the form of governmental
regulation or state imposed law, is necessary to solve society's most
intractable and recurrent problems of coordination. If it seems like
government can do a lot, it is because violence can do a lot.
To be sure, government and its use of coercive force is one
approach to solving certain problems. It may be, in some circumstances,
the most efficient approach to certain problems, as economist Joseph
Stiglitz has argued (Stiglitz, 1989). But just because government can do
a lot through violence, it does not necessarily follow that all solutions
to problems of order or coordination ought to employ government and
violence. It may very well be the case that many, and perhaps the most
efficient solutions to problems of social order and coordination are,
overlooked because of our reliance on government-based coercive
force.
To explore whether the coercive violence underlying
governmental regulation is over-utilized, we first need to examine the
common justifications for its use.
G. Marcus Cole
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B. The "Public Goods" Justification for Government Coercion

One of the most commonly asserted and widely accepted
defenses of government intervention into private activity is the "public
goods" justification. A "public good" may be defined as "a good that
can be produced only by collective action, but its production benefits
people regardless of whether they join in the collective effort"
(Schmidtz, 1991). Neo-classical economists define a public good as a
benefit that is both non-exclusive and not exhausted by consumption
(Samuelson, 1964). By non-exclusivity they mean that the good, once
provided, benefits both those who pay for its provision as well as those
who do not. This "free rider" problem, then, is thought to cause public
goods to be under-provided. As a result, government is justified, as this
argument goes, to intervene and tax or otherwise coerce beneficiaries
of the public good to pay for it. Mancur Olson goes further, asserting
that "kJ state is first of all an organization that provides public goods
for its citizens, its members" (Olson, 1965). Olson not only justifies
state action through the lens of public goods; he justifies the existence
of the state itself through public goods.
The public goods argument is also frequently extended to
include things which, by definition, are not public goods, but which
have some characteristics of public goods. Things that confer positive
externalities are things that are, by definition, underappreciated by the
market, and therefore worthy of state intervention. Subsidies and
patents, for example, owe much of their existence to this extension of
the public goods justification (Lemley, 2005; Nachbar, 2005).
The corollary of this extension of the public goods justification
is that anything that creates a negative externality warrants
governmental regulation or prohibition (Stiglitz, 1989). Monopolies,
trusts, and other "anti-competitive" activity, it is argued, undermines
competition, raising prices (even where short-term predatory pricing
lowers them), and harming us all in the long run. Monopolies, therefore,
as the corollary runs, must be regulated, limited, or broken up.
The public goods argument then, as summarized by Michael
G. Marcus Cole
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Taylor, is that "[t]he most persuasive justification of the state is founded
on the argument that, without it, people would not successfully
cooperate in realizing their common interests and in particular would
not provide themselves with certain public goods" (Taylor, 1987). It
follows that government coercion is necessary to provide benefits that
rational individuals would deny themselves, as a group, because of the
individual's temptation to "free ride" on the efforts of others.
C. The "Common Pool" Justification for Government Coercion
A related, but not coextensive justification for government
intervention is that set of problems which have come to be known in
the legal and economics literature as "common pool" problems (Smith,
1987). Common pool problems are a form of collective action problems
in which many individuals have a claim on or use for a common
resource, but uncoordinated individual efforts to consume that resource
lay waste to it.
This "tragedy of the commons" is best illustrated through an
example (Hardin, 1968). Suppose a common plot of land with a single
resource, say, trees, is bordered by the private property of four
individuals, Ms. A, Mr. B, Mr. C, and Ms. D. As a conscientious and
considerate neighbor, Ms. A wants to go onto the commons to take just
enough firewood to last her through the coming winter. She thinks she
should do just that, but then a disturbing thought creeps into her polite,
thoughtful mind. What would she do next winter if her three neighbors
completely decimated the forest on the commons? Indeed, two of her
neighbors may be just as conscientious as she, but what if the third is
not? "That one, inconsiderate, selfish, or careless neighbor could ruin
the resource for the rest of us," she thinks. Her next thought is the
realization that unless she gathers as much firewood as she is able, she
has no guarantee that the resource will be available for her use in the
future.
As Ms. A thinks through the possibilities, she is blissfully
unaware that Mr. B. has also realized that his enjoyment of the common
G. Marcus Cole
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resource is assured only to the extent that he carries off as much wood
as he can gather in the present, whether he needs it now or not. And as
each of the neighbors entertains the same disturbing thoughts, a tragedy
ensues. The resource is depleted, not through use, need, or present
enjoyment, but through fear and self-preservation. The tragedy is a
tragedy precisely because it is so unnecessary. Disinterested and
omniscient third party observers can see that each of the neighbors are
honest, hardworking, and conscientious. Only ignorance and feat stand
between the neighbors and their collective self-interests. They are
ignorant about the true character of each of their neighbors, and they
fear the worst in any one of them.
The tragedy is also a tragedy because there exists a ready
solution to it. Note that the tragedy does not occur on Ms. A's land,
even if she happens to harbor a resource the others want or need. The
neighbors do not lay waste to her resource because it is her resource. She
owns it, even if she does not herself need it. The neighbors, desirous of
her resource, will pay her for it. She, on the other hand, desirous of
something else, will accept payment for it. She will also nurture the
resource, protecting it from harm or waste, in order to be able to offer
it for sale to those in need of it. In other words, the solution to the
tragedy of the commons is to place someone in stewardship over it.
To solve the commons tragedy, we could divide the commons
up into quarters, and allocate each quadrant to each of our four
neighbors. Or we could assign the rights over the common resource to
just one of the four neighbors. If we choose Ms. A, she will care for and
sell the resource to those in need of it, just as she would any resource on
her original plot of land. Either way, we will have placed one person in
stewardship over any part of the resource, and by this we will have
gained assurance that it will be preserved for the benefit of anyone
needing it, and not wasted through ignorance and fear.
Many free-market advocates stop the analysis at this point, and
assert that the solution to the commons tragedy is private property. This
is a mistake. It is true that private property "places someone in
G. Marcus Cole
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stewardship over" the resource, but it is not true that private property
is the only device that accomplishes this task. Ms. A, Mr. B, Mr. C, and
Ms. D could, for example agree to hire a manager for the common
resource. They could also agree to "elect" a representative to manage it.
Since ignorance and fear are at the root of the commons tragedy,
solutions which address these toot problems will solve the tragedy.
Private property, contract, or government can address the problems of
ignorance and fear. Each of these solutions essentially places one party
in stewardship over the resource. The key to solving common pool
problems is to establish a single authority or decision-maker over the
common pool.
It is important to note at this point that common pool problems
are not coextensive with public goods problems. Many common pools,
such as natural resources, are thought of by neoclassicists as public
goods. When the air in the San Joaquin Valley, or the water in the
Hetch-Hetchy Valley is at issue, the overlap between public goods and
common pools seems complete.
The assets of an insolvent company, however, present a
different common pool problem, one that is private, not public. The
claimants on the assets of the firm each wants to be paid in full, and for
most creditors, the assets of the firm are larger than any one of their
claims. Yet, if all of them pursued their rights unfettered, the assets
would be ripped apart, and quite possibly rendered of less value than
might have been true had the "going-concern" value of the firm been
protected and preserved. In short, creditors can behave like Ms. A and
her three neighbors, laying waste to the asset pool in order to satisfy
their own individual need to be repaid. In short, rational individual
decision-making can lead to all of the creditors, as a collective, receiving
less that they might have received had they been able (or forced) to
cooperate. Nevertheless, note that this common pool problem is not a
public goods problem.
Bankruptcy law is a public, governmentally imposed solution to
the tragedy of the commons arising from corporate insolvency (Jackson,
G. Marcus Cole
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1984). But there are private solutions to corporate insolvency too, and
while these may exist in the shadow of bankruptcy law, they cannot be
characterized as governmentally imposed or reliant upon state action
and violence. In fact, these private solutions existed prior to the
establishment of bankruptcy law (Cole, 2000 and 2002). These
contractual workouts in debt finance, or "wind-ups" in equity finance,
are private alternatives to the government-based solution to the
common pool problem.
D. The Difference Between Consensual and Coercive Approaches
to Problems of Coordination
The existence of alternative solutions, public and private, to
public goods and common pool problems leaves us with a few
questions. First, "if both government-based and private, consensual
approaches can both solve these problems, then which approach should
we choose?" Second, "if both government and market approaches can
solve these problems, then does it matter which approach we choose?"
Because the answer to the first question is that there are social benefits
to private solutions which coercive solutions have difficulty mimicking.
This makes the answer to the second question an emphatic "yes."
Consensual or contractual solutions to coordination problems
can actually create wealth, rather than merely redistribute it. To see how
this is so, consider the following example. Suppose a village contains
just two members, Ms. Able and Mr. Brewer. Suppose further that there
are essentially two productive endeavors in which Ms. Able and Mr.
Brewer can engage, namely, bread—baking and shoe—making.
Bread—baking is a low—skilled activity. Anyone with time on
their hands and the raw materials can do it. Shoe—making, on the other
hand, is a high—skilled activity. Those with superior education and
training can make more shoes, given the same amount of time and
materials, than those without advanced training.
Mr. Brewer is a low—skilled worker. When he spends half a day
baking bread, he can bake fifteen loaves. If he were to spend a whole
G. Marcus Cole

45

Journal ofPrivate Entetprise, Special Issue, Volume XXII, Number 2, Spring 2007

day baking bread, he could bake thirty loaves. He would never do this,
however, since he also needs shoes. Mr. Brewer can make eight pairs of
shoes in half a day. He could make sixteen pairs in a whole day, but this
would leave him "breadless." So, Mr. Brewer divides his days. He
spends half a day baking bread fifteen loaves of bread, and half a day
making eight pairs of shoes.
Ms. Able, as her name implies, is a highly—trained, high—skilled
worker. When she spends half of her day baking bread, she can bake 15
loaves. When she spends a whole day baking bread, she can bake 30
loaves. In other words, she performs the low—skilled task with equal
productivity as Mr. Brewer.
When Ms. Able turns her attention and talents to making shoes,
however, she is able to produce twelve pairs of shoes in a half a day.
This is substantially more than Mr. Brewer's eight pairs in half a day. If
she could spend a whole day making shoes, she could actually produce
twenty-four pairs. She would never consider doing this, however, since
this would leave her breadless.

Table 1
Bread

Shoes

Ms. Able

15

12

Mr. Brewer

15

8

Total

30

20

G. Marcus Cole
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Suddenly, Ms. Able has an idea. "What if I do spend a whole day
devoted to doing what I do best: making shoes," she thought to herself.
"I could make lots of shoes, and then trade them for the bread I need
from someone who spends their time making bread." In short, Ms.
Able envisions a contractual division of labor, with her specializing in
shoemaking, while Mr. Brewer specializes in bread-baking.
When Ms. Able approaches Mr. Brewer with her idea, he is
persuaded to give it a try. If he spends his entire day baking bread, he
will produce thirty loaves, and can exchange some of them for the shoes
he needs. With this new arrangement, Ms. Able now produces no bread
and twenty-four pairs of shoes in a day. Mr. Brewer produces no shoes
and thirty loaves of bread in a day.
Table 2
Bread

Shoes

Ms. Able

0

24

Mr. Brewer

30

0

Total

30

24

.

Notice that, prior to their agreement, when Ms. Able and Mr.
Brewer were "self-sufficient," they produced a sum total of 30 loaves of
bread (fifteen from Able and fifteen from Brewer), and a sum total of
twenty pairs of shoes (twelve from Able and eight from Brewer). After
their cooperative agreement, the resultant division of labor result in the
same total number of loaves of bread (none from Able and thirty from
Brewer), but the total number of shoes is now twenty-four (none from
Brewer and twenty-four from Able). The "contract" between Able and
Brewer has increased their total productivity by four pairs of shoes.
Even if Able agrees to give Brewer only nine pairs of shoes in exchange
G. Marcus Cole
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for fifteen loaves of bread, they are both better off (Able by three pairs
of shoes, and Brewer by one pair of shoes) than they were under the
state of self-sufficiency.
The above hypothetical, and Tables 1 and 2, provide a simple
illustration of David Ricardo's Theory of Comparative Advantage
(Ricardo, 1817). The theory holds that, whenever one party holds
special talents, capital, or skills, a consensual exchange with another
party, even one with no special endowments, results in wealth creation.
The theory of comparative advantage is precisely why free trade
between nations, regardless of size or level of development, is
compelling.
But the theory of comparative advantage suggests more than
just free, consensual exchange is beneficial. It suggests that, when
confronted with the choice between consensual and coercive solutions
to public good and common pool problems, wealth-creating consensual
solutions ought to be preferred over governmental regulation and its
reliance upon the use of coercive physical force.
This analysis suggests that the widely held belief that
government regulation and its legitimized use of physical violence is the
presumptive solution to problems of coordination is without
foundation. Why, then, is this belief so common? Perhaps the
presumption that government is the solution to all problems persists
because of a perception that examples of private solutions are so
uncommon. If this perception is the cause of the "government first, last
and always" approach to coordination problems, the remainder of this
article is intended to deflate this perception. While the multitude of
examples of private legal ordering can be organized in numerous ways,
this Article characterizes them as either historical or contemporary. Part
II explores a few of the remarkable historical examples, while Part III
examines the ubiquity of private legal orders today.
II. Private Ordering in History
Since governmental solutions to problems of coordination are
G. Marcus Cole
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not presumptively superior to private solutions to the same problems,
why are there so few examples of private legal orders? Actually, the
literature on the history of private institutions, trade, and associations
is replete with examples of highly sophisticated private solutions to
complex problems. The selected examples explored below include the
Maghribi Traders of the 11 th century, the origins of American fraternal
societies, miners and cattle ranchers in the American Old West,
segregated schools in West Virginia in the early 1900's, free banking in
Scotland in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and the emergence of
financial markets in Amsterdam and London in the 17 th and 18th
centuries.
A. The Maghribi Traders
In his article, Reputations and Coalitions in Medieval Trade, Avner
Greif describes an intricate trading network that persisted throughout
the Mediterranean world in the eleventh century (Greif, 1989). Evidence
of these complex trading arrangements were discovered among
documents found in the geniza of an ancient synagogue in Cairo in the
late 1800's. The documents reveal a society of merchants known as the
Maghribi Traders.
The Maghribi were a "coalition" of Jewish merchants residing
in North African towns and villages. What makes their business
practices of interest is that they traded across the Mediterranean,
through overseas agents, without the benefit of government
enforcement of their contracts. Instead, the Maghribi relied upon a
complex network of religious affiliations and rules of membership,
allowing for enforcement of contracts through a stringent reputation
mechanism. A merchant in North Africa would place a substantial
amount of merchandise into the care of an overseas agent, charged with
the responsibility of-transporting the items across the Mediterranean for
sale in Europe. The agent would sell the merchandise in Europe, and
return to the merchant in North Africa with the proceeds, whereupon
the merchant would confer upon the agent his commission. Agents
G. Marcus Cole
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could work exclusively for one merchant, but often worked for several
merchants throughout their lives.
The geniza documents provide explanations of how the
ordinary practice of trans-Mediterranean trade was conducted, in part
because it also contained records of "trials" and other dispute resolution
proceedings. When disputes arose, they were settled under Jewish law,
and often within the local synagogue. When an agent or merchant was
found guilty of cheating the other, the sanctions were heavy. They
included expulsion from the trading network. In other words, an agent
found guilty of "skimming" profits or otherwise cheating his merchant
would never be entrusted with goods again, not just by the injured
merchant, but by any Maghribi merchant along the Northern coast of
Africa. To enforce these judgments, names and descriptions of the
offender were posted in synagogues throughout the region.
Punishments for merchants found cheating their agents were
equally harsh, and included prohibitions against the use of Maghribi
agents for overseas trade, as well as stiff monetary damages. One of the
harshest penalties took the form of prohibiting the children of
offending merchants and agents from participating in the trading
network.
The penalties for breaching overseas trading agreements appear
to have been quite effective. In fact, the geniza records include many
examples of agents and merchants willingly paid multiples of the
claimed damages, purportedly in an attempt to provide assurances of
futw:e trustworthiness.
What makes the Maghribi Traders example particularly
noteworthy is the fact that a complex regime of contracts were enforced
entirely without the aid or "shadow" of government and coercive force.
No government of the eleventh century could claim jurisdiction of the
entire Mediterranean. Nor is there any evidence that any of the
contracts among the Maghribi traders were subject to any government
enforcement. This private legal order was enforced entirely through
reputation mechanisms. Even the "end game" scenario, which
G. Marcus Cole
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capitalizes on the weaknesses of many reputation mechanisms, fails to
undermine the Maghribi system. The desire to see ones children take
over the lucrative family business appears to have caused even "retiring"
agents and merchants to respect their contractual commitments.
B. American Fraternal Societies
Private ordering need not always entail commercial transactions
or relationships to work. They can also be centered upon social welfare
and mutual aid. David Beito, in his article Mutual Aid for Social Welfare:
The Case of Ametican Fraternal Societies, exposes the important role once
played by the now seemingly innocuous fraternal associations that dot
the landscape of middle class America today (Beito, 1990).
According to Beito, an estimated thirty percent of the adult male
population of the United States belonged to fraternal societies in the
years leading up to the Great Depression, and an even larger percentage
of African-Americans belonged to such organizations. After churches,
these organizations were the largest providers of aid and social welfare
in the United States. Unlike the government welfare state that would
succeed it in the "New Deal," these fraternal societies were based upon
a concept of reciprocity and mutuality. The largest of these groups
included the Masons, the Elks, and the Odd Fellows, but other smaller
fraternal societies functioned the same way.
The principal function of these fraternal societies, as originally
conceived, was to provide mutual aid. This aid took several forms,
including housing and care for elderly members, health and accident
insurance, and burial insurance. For example, by 1929, thirty-nine
Masonic jurisdictions, and forty-seven Odd Fellows chapters had built
homes for their elderly members. Interestingly, even in an era before
Social Security, few of these homes needed to be filled to capacity.
Similarly, fraternal societies of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries provided members and their families death and
health insurance benefits. In fact, prior to the Great Depression,
fraternal 'societies dominated the health insurance market for the
G. Marcus Cole
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working class. This was due in large part to the competitive advantage
of fraternal societies in checking "moral hazard." Insureds were much
less likely to abuse coverage with the knowledge that others in the
brotherhood would bear the burden.
Fraternal societies were particularly important in the
African-American community. Excluded from many of the institutions
and benefits associated with white organizations, African-American
formed their own, extensive network of mutual aid societies. The largest
of these were the Prince Hall Masons, with a membership of nearly a
third of the adult male population. The Prince Hall Masons provided
perhaps more services than their white counterparts, including
orphanages and employment bureaus in addition to medical insurance
and homes for the aged.
Mutual aid societies began to decline in use in the late 1920's
and early 1930's, just at the onset of the Great Depression and the New
Deal. While there are several plausible theories for their decline, Beito
offers adverse selection and the rise of state insurance regulation as the
most likely culprits. Since membership premiums were uniform, bad
risks were subsidized, in the long run, by good risks. In such a scenario,
it is only a matter of time before the good risks catch on and defect
from the insurance pool, leaving just the now unsubsidized bad risks.
State prohibitions on certain forms of insurance, such as individual
old-age insurance plans, may also have doomed fraternal aid societies.
In the end, the onset of the welfare state substituted government aid for
private, mutual aid. Consensual, contractual solutions to the problems
of common risk pools gave way to the coercive, tax and spend regimes
that characterize social insurance today.
C. Miners and Cattle Ranchers of the American Old West
The Old West provides numerous examples of order without
government. Many of these examples involve coordination problems.
Yet, there are few coordination problems that pose the difficulties of
the provision of law itself. Law is often regarded as the quintessential
G. Marcus Cole
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public good (Morriss, 1998). Nevertheless, Andrew Morriss, in his
article, Miners, Vigilantes, and Cattlemen: Overcoming Free-RiderProblems in
the Private Provision ofLaw, has chronicled the development of customary
legal orders in mining communities in California and the Black Hills,
cattlemen in Montana, and the vigilance committees of San Francisco.
Most of these legal orders developed prior to the arrival of
governmental authority in those territories.
While these various communities had many differences, they all
shared some things in common in their efforts to provide their own
private law. First, they all developed their own rules regarding claims,
land acquisition, and trespass. These rules were established by
contractual agreements among the various community members.
Second, these communities policed or enforced violations of the
actual social compact through group action. A consensus that a violator
needed to be punished was reached, and once reached, depended upon
the community acting en mass to bring the violator into compliance or
driven out of the society. In fact, enforcement in these communities
depended heavily on consensus, since individual enforcement was at
least discouraged, and often prohibited individually enforced sanctions.
D. Segregated Schools in West Virginia in the Early 1900's
Some of the best historical examples of private ordering
illustrate how market forces can provide so-called public goods at the
very same time that the tools of government and coercion are being
used to suppress them. Economist Price Fishback provides just such an
example in his article, Can Competition Among Employers Reduce
Governmental Discrimination? Coal Companies and Segregated Schools in West
Virginia I the Early 1 900 's.
Fishback reports that in the first decade of the twentieth
century, West Virginia, like many other Southern states, afforded public
education to all white children, but only a handful of black children
through the state's segregated school system (Fishback, 1989). At the
very same time, coal companies in West Virginia, desperate for labor,
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sought ways to attract workers. The companies found black workers
relatively unresponsive to increased wages, in part because segregated
West Virginia gave black workers few channels to spend the money they
earned. The coal companies soon realized that one way to attract
workers was to offer them something that money could not buy,
namely, quality education for their children.
The coal companies, in response to this market opportunity,
opened private schools for the children of black workers. The schools
were quickly regarded as high quality, even by white parents in
surrounding communities. In fact, the educational quality of these
schools was so well regarded that white parents began to seek admission
to the schools for their own children. Elementary education, often
characterized as a prototypical public good, was produced at a level of
quality so high that it led to one of the rare instances of white parents
in the segregated South seeking to have their children educated
alongside black children.
E. Free Banking in Scotland, 1792-1845
Perhaps the one area in which government activity is nearly
universally perceived as essential is in the area of central banking.
George Selgin provides good reason to question this presumption in his
book on The Theog of Free Banking: Money Supply Under Competitive Note
Issue. In his book, Selgin tells the story of a sophisticated, highly
complex, and indeed modern banking system that operated in Scotland
from 1792 until it was abolished by act of Parliament in 1845 (Selgin,
1988).
During the period of free banking in Scodand, the country
enjoyed no central bank, and,imposed no banking regulations of any
significance. Instead, banks were fully exposed to the market, and this
exposure in turn prompted conservative banking practices. Because
banks were permitted to fail, as some did from time to time, the success
or failure of a bank depended entirely on how well it was managed and
its reputation for reliability and stability.
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The operation of Scottish banks during the period of freedom
was straightforward. Each bank issued its own pound notes, redeemable
for specie at the bank. The value of these notes depended entirely upon
the bank's stability and its reputation for honoring each and every note.
Failure to honor a note was tantamount to failure of the bank.
A merchant accepting a Scottish bank pound note would
deposit the note in his own bank. The merchant's bank would credit the
merchant's account for the value of the note, while forwarding the note
through a clearing-house to the originating bank. The originating bank
would identify the note as its own, forwarding specie through the
clearing-house back to the merchant's bank in redemption of the note.
The market discipline of this system lay in the practical
requirement for banks to maintain adequate reserves of specie. Failure
to maintain conservative levels of reserves exposed a bank to runs, and,
in the end, ruin. This system of free banking operated relatively
uneventfully until it was ended when the British Parliament sought to
extend the reach and authority of the Bank of England by the passage
of Peel's Act in 1845.
F. The Emergence of Stock Markets in Amsterdam and
London
Advocates of state rule making often assert that private legal
orders can only operate in the shadow of government and coercive rule
enforcement. Yet some of the most complex of all orders, public or
private, have emerged outside of or prior to the reach of government
regulators. Economist Edward Stringham., in two articles, explains the
early development of stock markets in Amsterdam and London as
characterized by private rules operating without resort to government
enforcement.
In the early 1600's, at a time when government courts were not
enforcing many financial contracts, the commodities bourse in
Amsterdam became the locus of trading in sophisticated financial
instruments, ' including equities, futures, and option contracts
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(Stringham, 2003). These trades occurred in a relatively open regulatory
environment, even though the Dutch government repeatedly undertook
steps to limit or ban many of these practices. Short-selling, in particular,
brought government scrutiny, since it was believed at the time to a
manipulative way to foster volatility in the market. Despite official
prohibitions and ordinances banning speculative transactions, these
trades persisted throughout the seventeenth century.
The persistence of sophisticated speculative trading in direct
contravention of governmental regulation and law raises an important
question. If the transactions at issue were illegal, how could parties to
them trust that they would be honored? Stringham demonstrates that
the traders on the Dutch bourse relied almost exclusively on reputation
mechanisms to enforce their contracts. Disreputable traders were
marginalized, and eventually driven out of business. Successful traders
guarded their reputations as precious capital in a highly competitive
market.
Stringham reports a similar, but more formal reliance on
reputation in the spontaneous emergence of the London Stock
Exchange (Stringham, 2002). In 1762, one hundred and fifty brokers,
in an effort to screen out less reputable trading partners, "contracted
with Jonathan's Coffeehouse to use it exclusively." When this attempt
at forming a private club failed due to the lawsuit of an excluded broker,
the members eventually formed a members-only Subscription Room,
limiting membership to those of "the most respectable character," and
imposing fines on those whose transactions or behavior failed to
achieve this standard.
While the London Stock Exchange operated as a private club
with private law, it faced competitive pressure from other exchanges,
including the Royal Exchange and the trading floor made available by
the Bank of England, to make and keep its private rules efficient. The
effectiveness of the exchange's private law is highlighted by the fact that
in 1877, after more than 100 years in operation, the British Government
itself declared that the Stock Exchanges rules "had been salutary to the
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interests of the public." In short, the private law enacted and enforced
by the London Stock Exchange had been a public good.
III. Private Ordering Today
It may be easy to dismiss the numerous historical examples of
complex legal orders and relationships in the absence of government
and coercive force as quaint artifacts of a bygone era. The dismissals
become more difficult, however, when the illustrations take on a
contemporary context. Characteristics of private legal ordering can be
found among diamond merchants in New York's Diamond District,
Underwriters' Laboratories, cattle ranchers in California's Shasta
County, Peru's black market for housing and street merchants, the
Japanese financial clearinghouse "guillotine," and the "London
approach" to corporate reorganization. Each of these examples is
explored below.
A. The Diamond Merchants
Perhaps the most widely recognized example of extra-legal
private ordering today is that brought to light by Lisa Bernstein in her
article, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industg (Bernstein, 1992). In it, Bernstein describes a complex
world of very simple rules and relationships. Diamond merchants, in
order to participate in the diamond business at the wholesale level, must
be members of a diamond bourse. Membership in the bourse entitles is
highly prized because it entitles members to distribute diamonds from
the mining companies on the international market retailers and
sub-wholesalers at the national level.
But because membership is both prized and limited, members
of the bourse fiercely guard their reputations for fair dealing. Members
also agree that should a dispute arise with another member of the
bourse, the dispute will be resolved before a committee comprised of
members of other bourse members. Under no circumstances is a
member of the bourse to take a dispute to a government court of law.
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Cheaters who are unwilling to submit disputes to the bourse, or
unwilling to abide by decisions of the bourse are subject to banishment,
not just from their local bourse, but also from diamond bourses around
the world. Photographs and names of cheaters are circulated and posted
in each bourse to ensure enforcement of the system and its rules. There
is even a remedy against "end game" strategies of those nearing
retirement from the diamond business: children of cheaters are banished
from the diamond industry too. Unlike many private legal orders, the
diamond merchant order exists within the context or backdrop of the
potential for government law enforced. Nevertheless, the diamond
merchants and the rules of the bourse operate without specific reference
to external legal relationships of law enforcement. Like the financial
markets of 16th century Amsterdam, the diamond bourse can be thought
of as a legal order operating in spite of rather than in the shadow of,
government-based law.
B. Underwriters Laboratories
In his article, A Symbol of Se0DI: The Origins of Underwriters'
Laboratories, Harry Chase Brearly, the metallurgist who invented stainless
steel, depicts a private order arising out of necessity and consent.
Insurance companies in the late nineteenth century were confronted
with a problem. As Brearly puts it,
No sooner have we seized upon some new facility than we are
likely to learn that nature may exact a serious price for its use. One
evidence of this is found in fire losses which, in the United States,
increased more than one thousand per cent between 1865 and 1922, while the
population increased but two hundred percent. A study of fire causes
shows that a large part of that loss can be traced to comparatively new
devices and processes (Brearly, 1997).
In other words, insurers faced a problem of information
asymmetries. On the one hand, even if insureds were not engaged in
moral hazard, insureds had more information about which products
they would purchase and use in the home than insurers could ever
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access. On the other hand, insurers had access to the most state of the
art scientific testing and expertise. Furthermore, all of the insurance
companies shared the same interest in reducing unnecessary fires. The
difficult question before the insurance companies was "how do we get
sophisticated scientific information into the hands of relatively
unsophisticated consumers, in a form in which consumers can make use
of the information to reduce fires?"
The answer came when several insurers agreed to pool resources
to test and certify household devices. Consumers without any scientific
background or education at all could rely upon the simple Underwriters'
Laboratories mark as an assurance that a household device was safe.
Manufacturers, in turn, could use UL certification as a marketing tool,
channeling their own reputational capital into this simple signaling
device. In short, the problem of information asymmetry and
coordination between manufacturers, consumers, and insurers, was
solved through the pursuit of self-interest to the benefit, or public good,
of all.
C. Shasta County Cattle Ranchers
Private ordering does not merely provide solutions to
coordination problems in the absence of law. It also can provide more
efficient solutions to coordination problems when law attempts to solve
them inefficiently. An example of this can be found in the rural,
Northern California county of Shasta, as documented by Robert
Ellickson in his book, Order Without Law.
Ellickson describes the simple and long-standing rule developed
by Shasta County cattle ranchers to avoid or quickly settle disputes over
encounters with a neighbor's cattle. California law already provides legal
rules and procedures for handling such disputes. The formal state law
divides portions of the county into two types of land for purposes of
cattle trespass disputes, namely, "open-range" and "closed range"
(Ellickson, 1991).
The difference between the two types of range reflects the
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different types of environments in which cattle might be found to
trespass onto a neighbor's property. In the relatively more densely
populated areas, designated as "closed range," cattle are required to be
fenced and controlled. Any breach of a neighbor's property is an
offense for which the cattle owner is strictly liable. In the relatively less
densely populated areas of the county, designated as "open range,"
cattle must be expected to wander and graze. Accordingly, the formal
state law rule provides for no liability, even if the damage to a
neighbor's property is the result of the cattle owner's negligence.
The actual rule followed by the people of Shasta County bears
virtually no resemblance to California state law. The rule followed by
residents is very simple: if cattle trespass on a neighbor's .property, the
owner of the cattle is liable for any damage caused. Ellickson makes
clear that this rule is unenforceable in court. Nevertheless, court cases
enforcing the formal rule are virtually non-existent. Ellickson suggests
this is because, as the ranchers themselves told him, almost everyone
follows the informal rule.
When Ellickson pressed the residents of Shasta County to
explain how this informal rule is enforced, they explained that the
sanctions for breech were a matter of very tough and assisted
"self-help." While the residents gave some examples of accounts of
which they heard, few claimed to have been eyewitnesses to, let alone
to have participated in, enforcement.
D. The Black Market for Housing and Necessities in Peru
When formal, state-operated legal orders operate inefficiently,
they can lead to more than just the inconveniences of rural life in
Northern California. Inefficient government-based legal rules can lead
to poverty and despair, as graphically exposed by Hernando de Soto in
his book, The OtherPath: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World (de Soto
1989).
In Peru, after yeats of failed socialist policies and government
corruption, the people, according to de Soto, have taken their economic
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condition into their own hands. The unavailability of affordable housing
due to unrealistic building codes has forced many prospective
homeowners to invest in black market real estate. These homeowners
purchase apartments or houses without approval or recognition of the
formal land transfer or recording authority or laws. The unofficial title
obtained is respected and honored, however, by neighbors and
newcomers, as evidenced by the marketability of informal deeds.
Neighbors actually assist in repelling squatters to enforce informal titles
to land.
A similar black market has arisen for the provision of
necessities. Although the government requires vendors to hold licenses
in order to sell goods on the street, the process of obtaining a license is
cumbersome and fraught with corruption and red tape. Even when a
vendor is able to obtain a license, formal, legal distribution channels are
characterized by chronic shortages.
Fortunately, the poor in Peru have been able to rely upon black
market vendors to provide their basic necessities, including food and
clothing, at prices lower than available in licensed, "authorized"
vendors. According to de Soto, these informal markets provide an
"other" path, more promising than the alternative alluded to in the
title's thinly veiled reference to the Marxist Shining Path guerilla
movement.
E. The Japanese Financial Clearinghouse Guillotine
Although free banking, on the scale of eighteenth century
Scotland, no longer exists, many of the private ordering structures upon
which free banking was based can be found within many modem
institutions. An example of this is provided in Mark Riser's explication
of the Japanese financial clearinghouse system and its "guillotine"
(Ryser, 1997).
In Sanctions Without Law: The Japanese Financial Clearinghouse
Guillotine and Its Impact on Default Rates, Riser the informal but
devastating enforcement mechanism underlying Japan's financial
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clearinghouse. At the end of each day's business, banks receiving checks
or promissory notes drawn on another bank submit them to the
clearinghouse for presentment to the originating bank. The
clearinghouse, which has already transferred funds for the instrument,
is then repaid by the issuing bank. This system breaks down, however,
if an issuing bank refuses to pay on one of its checks or notes.
In order to protect the clearinghouse and the system, banks
refusing to honor their checks or notes are subjected to the most severe
of punishments, namely, they are precluded from processing any further
business through the clearinghouse. Furthermore, any other member
bank not severing ties with the offending bank is effectively ejected
from participation in the clearinghouse. In short, the consequence for
a bank that fails to honor its instruments is, quite literally, death.
Accordingly, the practice has come to be known as the "guillotine," and
it is believed to minimize bank default rates in Japan.
F. The "London Approach" to Corporate Reorganization
Sanctions in the private legal orders governing corporate finance
are not always so abrupt and final. When large British corporations find
themselves in financial distress, and in need of restructuring, the resort
to an informal process known as "The London Approach" (Armour
and Deakin, 2001).
According to John Armour and Simon Deakin in their article
Norms in Plivate Insolveng: The 'London Approach' to the Resolution of
Financial Distress, large corporate insolvencies in Britain are routinely
handled outside of the formal processes associated with bankruptcy. A
company seeking to restructure in Britain, given the absence of an
equivalent to Chapter 11 in American law, approaches its "lead banker"
to negotiate a deal with its other creditors. The lead banker then helps
the company develop a restructuring plan, which the lead bank will then
present to the other creditors.
The lead banker is typically in a position to do this, since it
ordinarily holds a blanket security interest in the assets of the firm.
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When the lead bank originally lends to the debtor corporation, it
typically syndicates its debt position by selling off a "piece of the
action" to other London banks, which routinely purchase it" for
purposes of investment diversification. In a symbiotic manner, the lead
banker on one corporation is likely to be a participant in another
company with syndicated debt. After securing unanimous consent from
the other creditors to the restructured debt contracts, the lead bank
oversees the corporate restructuring.
When a participating bank refuses to cooperate with the lead
bank, two types of informal or semi-formal sanctions are threatened or
employed. First, uncooperative banks are shunned from future debt
syndications, effectively locking them out of a relatively small club of
fewer than 300 banks. Second, the lead banker can request that the
Bank of England conduct enquiries into the reasons for the bank's
reluctance. This sanction, involving a face-to-face meeting with bank
regulators, is referred to as "being asked to tea with the Queen." Since
participating banks seek to avoid either sanction, the judgment of the
lead bank in the restructuring is often respected. The lead bank's
judgment is trusted too, since it is just as likely to be in a reciprocal
position when the next large corporate distress case is announced.
IV. The Future of Private Ordering
The prevalence of historical and contemporary examples of
private legal orders is no guarantee that such systems will be relied upon
to solve coordination problems in the future. Indeed, the growth of
government and the extra territorial assertion of governmental authority
in cases involving intellectual property or intern& traffic suggests that
private legal orders will have significant competition from coercive
regulatory regimes.
Cause. for hope can be found among the increasing number of
scholars and policy makers considering private legal alternatives. Some
of the characteristics of successful private orders, however, might
temper out hope with cause for concern.
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Several scholars have posited private legal orders to supplant
many activities that most observers assume are the natural function of
government. Legal scholars such as Randy Barnett have envisioned
"polycentric legal systems" (Barnett, 1984). These legal systems would
abandon government courts, replacing them with private judges
modeled on today's arbitrators and mediators. Barnett would actually
encourage the development of private, contractual and non-territorial
police forces, with overlapping jurisdiction and pre-negotiated treaties
to resolve disputes between forces. Jurisdictional competition between
courts and police forces, according to Barnett, would result in
increasingly efficient and fair law enforcement.
Another glimmer of hope for the expanded reliance on private
ordering wises from the Free Market Environmentalism movement.
Economists like Terry Anderson, Donald Leal, and others have
demonstrated the effectiveness of market forces at regulating unwanted
behavior (Anderson and Leal, 1991). In many instances, these measures
have already proven more successful at natural resource conservation
than government regulation (Schmidtz and Willott, 2001).
A third source of opportunity for private ordering arises from
the growth of cyberspace. While much on-line activity appears to be
unregulated, it should be noted that at least one scholar, Lawrence
Lessig, has identified numerous ways in which human behavior is
constrained and ordered by the architecture, norms, and private
institutions comprising the internet (Lessig, 2000). These private legal
structures are in a battle with government regulators for control of the
space that Lessig characterizes as a commons (Lessig, 2001).
One final area for the increasing resort to private law is in the
area of transnational corporate governance. Most markets are now
global in scope, and corporate activity is increasingly transnational.
National governments have stepped up attempts to regulate and tax
transnational corporate activity, even when that activity takes place
partially or wholly outside a particular nation's borders. Corporations
have attempted to combat these encroachments through various
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corporate governance devices, including "ring-fencing" and choice of
law provisions in contracts. Ring fencing is the practice of severing
corporate activity into distinct corporate subsidiaries, so as to remove
that activity from the reach of certain legal regimes or jurisdictions
(Cole, 2002). Both ring-fencing and contractual choice of law provisions
are limited in effectiveness, however, as long as they are based upon
existing, governmentally-based legal regimes. Choice-of-law provisions,
for example, are limited for reasons of efficiency, among others, to a
handful of legal regimes (most typically, New York or Delaware law)
(Eisenberg and Miller, 2006). Similarly, ring-fencing requires corporate
actors to choose an existing corporate law regime for purposes of
chartering and application of the internal affairs doctrine for choice of
law (Cole, 2002).
Even if opportunities for private ordering appear to be
expanding, they should not be approached with unguarded optimism.
Many of the historical examples of private legal orders suggest we
proceed with caution. Andrew Morriss depiction of Montana cattle
ranchers, for example, appears to imply a requisite level of homogeneity
of interests and characteristics between members of or participants in
the private legal order (Morriss, 1998). If this is true in other cases,
private legal orders may be as detrimental to the prospects for freedom
as they are to its enemies.
One check on these types of concerns, however, might be the
freedom of market actors to choose the orders to which they belong.
To be welfare enhancing, private orders must be consensual. Otherwise,
they devolve into government. This constraint limits the ability of many
types of ex post property coordination problems, for example, from
being true private orders, rather than the most oppressive form of
coercive governmental force (Heller and Hills, 2007).
V. Conclusion
Contemporary public policy debates are replete with discussions
of how government should solve problems of social coordination.
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Rarely do such discussions begin with a justification for government
action and its implicit use of physical violence, nor do such discussions
explore whether government is even the appropriate institution for
addressing coordination concerns.
This Article attempts to place the "horse before the cart." First,
it demonstrates that knee-jerk assumptions about the appropriateness
and effectiveness of government approaches to coordination problems
are false at a theoretical level. Second, it surveys the literature on private
legal solutions to problems of coordination. This survey shows that
historical examples of market-based solutions to coordination problems
abound. Furthermore, this Article shows that many contemporary
examples of private ordering operate independently of formal,
state-based law enforcement.
Finally, this article suggests areas of opportunity for the future
of private ordering, but cautions that private ordering is not a
universally utopian solution to all problems of human coordination.
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